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ln the Supreine Court of the 
State of Utah 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs .. 
OPAL JOHNSON, individually and 
as Administratrix of the Estate of 
Clyde W. Johnson, deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 11159 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Defendant, by counterclaim, is endeavoring to prevent 
cancellartion of health and accidenrt insurance with life in-
surance coverage. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Lower court held defendant was entitled to coverage 
and awarded judgment against plaintiff. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The affiiming of trial court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts of Appellant are essentially 
accurate. However, it is not conceded that defendant ans-
wered questions falsely but that the plaintiff's agent testj. 
fied that they were falsely answered. The Findings of 
Fact of the trial court best state defendant's position and 
are as follows: 
"That on October 17, 1957, at the solicitation of the 
plaintiff's agent, one Niles M. Wing, the defendant, Clyde 
W. Johnson, deceased, did make application and receive a 
Health and Accident policy from the plaintiff company, said 
policy containing an incontestable provision when it had 
been in effect for a period of two years; on the 2nd day of 
February, 1960, at the solicitation of the same agent, and 
upon being informed that he wa:s no longer eligible to con· 
tinue the policy issued on October 17, 1957, said defendam 
did purchase, on February 2, 1960, a Health and Accident 
policy which, again, contained an incontestable provision 
after having been in force and effect for a period of two 
years; after the policy purchased on February 2, 1960, had 
been in effect approximately five years, and at the urging 
of the same agent for the plaintiff company, one Niles M. 
·wing, this defendant did allow the previous policy to laµ;e 
and before said policy had lapsed did acquire, through said 
agent, on September 3, 1965, a new Health and Accident 
policy which insured the life of Clyde W. Johnson in the 
amount of $2,000.00 payable to the defendant Opal John· 
son, the administratrix of his estate. Said policy also pro-
A 
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vided medical and hospital benefits which were made pay-
able to the insured or his estate, all as more fully appears 
from the said policy of insurance. 
That the application for insurance completed on the 
3d day of September, 1965, was completed by the agent, 
Niles M. Wing, and all answers inserted by him. The ans-
wers contained in Pavt II thereof, paragraphs 2 (a), (b), 
(c), and (d), 'Have you or any person in your family been 
treated for serious physical disorders or had been hospital-
ized during the post five years,' were false; that in fact the 
application upon its face showed that 1the defendant, Opal 
Johnson, had been hospitalized in 1959 for a bladder infec-
tion, and it was admitted by the plaintiff's agent, Niles M. 
Wing, that he was in error in answering this section of the 
application. Said answers were false in that the defend-
ant, Clyde W. Johnson, had been afflicted with, prior there-
to, a chronic heart disease which had been detected in 
March of 1964. The defendant, Clyde W. Johnson, follow-
ing his ,being told of said heart disease, had continued to 
engage in his plumbing business upon a full time basis un-
til shortly before open heart surgery in March of 1966, and 
as a direct result of said surgery did die. 
That in the policies issued hy the plaintiff company 
to the said decedent, Clyde W. Johnson, in 1957 and 1960, 
the following provisions were contained: 
'Time Limit on Certain Defenses: (a) After two 
years from the date a person becomes covered under 
this Policy, no misstatements, except fraudulent mis-
statements, made by the appplicant in the application 
for coverage of such person shall be used to void the 
Policy or to deny a claim or loss incurred after the ex-
piration of such two year period. 
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( b) No claim for loss incurred with respect to any 
person after two years from the date such person 
berom~ covered under this Policy shall be reduced 
or demed on the ground that a disease or physical . 
d. . con }tlon not e~cluded from coverage by name or specific 
description effective on the date of loss had existed 
prior to the effective date of coverage of such person.' 
That upon all three occasions, when the defendant, 
Clyde W. Johnson, deceased, acquired policies from t:he 
plaintiff company, it was pursuant to the solicitations and 
urging of one Niles M. Wing, their agent and employee." 
ARGUl\lENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
THAT POLICY NO. WP2 510 001 WAS IN FORCE AND 
EFFECT AT THE TllVIE OF THE DEATH OF INSURED. 
A. Plaintiff should be estopped to deny coverage after 
policies with same company in force for some eight years 
and new policies substituted at urging of plaintiff's agent. 
It would appear unconcionable to allow plaintiff to de-
ny coverage after eight years when changes of policies 
were made at urging and request of plaintiff's agent. Th-
pedally so when the agent testified that the answers were 
incorrect in other respects and that he personally did not 
understand the meaning of the questions (TR. 51-52). Cer· 
tainly if the plaintiff's agent didn't know the meaning of 
the questions, the deceased cannot be deprived of coverage 
because it is claimed he gave an erroneous answer. 
When on the face of an application for insurance a 
question appears to have b2en imperfectly answered, and 
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the insurer issues a policy without further inquiry, it waives 
the wont of imperfection in the answer. 
See Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Berry 81 Ark. 92, 98 S.W. 
693; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Insurance Assoc. v. 
Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 47 S.W. 850; Phoenix Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 120 U.S. 190, 30 L. ed. 
646, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500. 
Also, an insurance company cannot itself make a mis-
take of fact in a contract and then claim a forfeiture against 
the insured because of a misstatement. 
Gray v. Stone, 102 Ark. 146, 143 S.W. 114; Dwelling 
l-IPuse Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 4 L.R.A. 
458, 11 S.W. 1016; Franklin Life Insurance Co. v. Gal-
ligos, 71 Ark. 295, 73 S.W. 102; Mutual Reserve Fund 
Life Assoc. v. Farmer, 65 Ark. 581, 57 S.W. 850. 
It is a well established precept of law that the Court 
will make every effort to protect the interests of rthe in-
sured as against the insurer by virtue of his having pre-
sumed to have had less knowledge as to the contents of 
the policy and the interpretation thereof. 
See Leon G. Pritchett v. Equitable Life and Casualty 
Insurance Co., 18 Utah 2d, Page 279, 421 P. 2d 943. 
B. The respondent is entitled to the coverage of Pol-
icy No. WP2 510 001 by virtue of the insured having had 
coverage with the appellant without lapse since 1957. 
The plaintiff, through their agent Niles M. Wing, sold 
three separate policies to the defendant, Clyde W. Johnson, 
deceased. The first policy dated October 17, 1957, was in 
effect until the second policy was obtained on February 2, 
1960. The second policy was in effect until November 8, 
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defendant to pw·chase a new insurance policey on the 3rd 
day of September, 1965, which was in effect until his death. 
Therefore, the uncontested facts show that the defendant, 
Clyde W. Johnson, deceased, was insmed with the same gen-
eral type of policy from 1957 w1til his death. Plaintiff ad-
mits th<it in each policy there was an incontestable provi-
sion of a maximum of two years (Par. 11, Pre-trial Order). 
This means that on the first two policies taken out by the 
decedent, had they stayed in effect, that the plaintiff would 
have no defense to any material misrepresentation as to 
pre-existing health con<.litions. 
This fact is the first basis upon which the defendant 
contends that the plaintiff should be estopped. from assert-
ing that the incontestable provision should n<Yt apply as of 
the effective date of the policy taken out either on Octo-
ber 17, 1957, or February 2, 1960. It would appear to the 
defendant to be tmconceionable to allow the plaintiff com-
pany, through its agent, to induce the deceased defendant 
to change policies when he had a vested right and, accord-
ing to their own declarations, apparently knew of a change 
in his health condition. It is obvious that the defendant 
would not jeopardize his po.sition which had, as I say, be-
come a vested one, had he known that in doing so he would 
be jeopardizing the security of his family. 
In supporting such position, the defendant cites for 
the Court's consideration 29 A,A.J. § 1127 which states: 
"Where a company assumes outstanding policies of 
the original insurer, agrees to be li.:lble Ln the sai_ne 
manner as the original insurer, and delivers to the u1• 
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sured a new certificate in lieu of the original, it has 
been held that the period for defending against the 
policy is regulated by the incontestability provisions 
of the original policy." 
See 110 A.L.R. 1139, 85 A.L.R. 240, 105 A.L.R. 997, 
which annotations contain munerous cases which defendant 
contends are pertinent. 
See also Wood v. Cosmopolitan Insurance Co., 266 Ill. 
App. 556, in which a policy was issued in 1926 containing 
a one year incontestable provision Later the defendant 
assumed the outstanding policy of the insured and agreed 
to be liable in tile same manner. Dea1Jh occurred within 
two years of taking the new policy and defendant raised 
the defense of the two year incontestable provision, and 
the Court held that the period of the first policy applied. 
Point I B (2), Page 15 of appellant's brief is ridicu-
lous. What he is saying is that if the applicant had a pre-
existing disease or physical condition and falsefied as to 
this fact, that no matter how long the policy was in foree 
the incontestable provision would not apply. I feel this 
position is so absurd that it warrants no comment. The 
terms of the policy speak for themselves in this regard. 
See 29 A, A.J. § 1114. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy on which deceased was paying premiums at 
time of death should be held to have been in force. Plain-
tiff company should be estopped to deny coverage when 
r ti by his their agent erroneously completed the app ica on 
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8 
own adrnis.sion and, further, the incontestable provision of 
previous policy should apply to the substituted policy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Respondent 
75 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 8400:1 
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